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ABSTRACT 
Germany still has a very generous public pay-as-you-go pension system. It is characterized by early 
effective retirement ages and very high effective replacement rates. Most workers receive virtually all 
of their retirement income from this public retirement insurance. Costs are almost 12 percent of GDP, 
more than 2.5 times as much as the U.S. Social Security System. 
The pressures exerted by population aging on this monolithic system, amplified by negative incentive 
effects, have induced a reform process that began in 1992 and is still ongoing. This paper has two parts. 
Part A describes the German pension system as it has shaped the labor market from 1972 until today. 
Part B describes the reform process which will convert the exemplary and monolithic Bismarckian 
public insurance system to a complex multipillar system. We provide a survey of the main features of 
the future German retirement system introduced by the so called “Riester Reform” in 2001 and an 
assessment in how far this last reform step will solve the pressing problems of the German system of 
old age provision. 
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The German Public Pension System: 
How it Was, How it Will Be 
by Axel H. Börsch-Supan and Christina B. Wilke 
 
1 Introduction: a Historical Perspective 
The German pension system was the first formal pension system in the world, designed by 
Bismarck almost 120 years ago. It has been very successful in providing a high and reliable 
level of retirement income in the past at reasonable contribution rates, and became a model for 
many social security systems around the world. It has survived two major wars, the Great 
Depression, and more recently, unification. It has been praised as one of the causes for social 
and political stability in Germany. 
As opposed to other countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which 
originally adopted a Beveridgian social security system that provided only a base pension, 
public pensions in Germany were from the start designed to extend the standard of living that 
was achieved during work life also to the time after retirement. Thus, public pensions are 
roughly proportional to labor income averaged over the entire life course and feature only few 
redistributive properties. We therefore call the German pension system „retirement insurance“ 
rather than „social security“ as in the United States, and workers used to understand their 
contributions as „insurance premia“ rather than „taxes“ – although this has dramatically 
changed in recent years. The insurance character is strengthened by institutional separation: the 
German retirement insurance system is not part of the government budget but a separate entity. 
This entity is subsidized by the federal government. Rationale for this subsidy – about 30 
percent of expenditures – are the non-insurance benefits such as benefits paid to German 
immigrants after opening the iron curtain. However, surplus contributions cannot be used to 
decrease the government deficit as it is done in the United States. 
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The German retirement insurance started as a fully funded system with a mandatory retirement 
age of 70 years when male life expectancy at birth was less than 45 years. Today, life 
expectancy for men is more than 75 years but average retirement age is less than 60 and even 
lower in East Germany.1  The system converted to a de facto pay-as-you-go system when most 
funds were invested in government bonds between the two world wars. After a long and 
arduous debate, the German Bundestag decided in 1957 to convert the system gradually to a 
pay-as-you-go scheme. The remainder of the capital stock was spent about 10 years later. Since 
then, the German system is purely pay-as-you-go with a very small reserve fund lasting less 
than 14 days of expenditures in August 2003. 
The retirement behavior visible in current data is mainly influenced by the 1972 reform which 
made the German pension system one of the most generous of the world. The 1972 system is 
generous in two respects. First, the system has a high replacement rate, generating net 
retirement incomes that are currently about 70 percent of pre-retirement net earnings for a 
worker with a 45-year earnings history and average lifetime earnings.2 This is substantially 
higher than, e.g., the corresponding U.S. net replacement rate of about 53 percent.3 The high 
initial level of public pensions was exacerbated by indexation to gross wages. Second, the 1972 
reform abolished the mandatory retirement age of 65 years for those with a long service life4 in 
favor of a flexible choice during a “window of retirement” between age 63 and 65, with no 
actuarial adjustments. Adding to these very generous early retirement provisions were easy 
ways to claim disability benefits and low mandatory retirement ages for women and 
unemployed, further increasing the number of beneficiaries and extending the “window of 
retirement” between 60 and 65. 
Hence, it is no surprise that the German public pension system is the single largest item in the 
social budget. In the year 2000, public pension expenditures amounted to some 200 billion 
                                                 
1 Average retirement age in a given year is the average age of those workers receiving public pension income for 
the first time. Source: VDR (2002). 
2 This replacement rate is defined as the current pension of a retiree with a 45-year average earnings history 
divided by the current average earnings of all dependently employed workers. It is different from the replacement 
rate relative to the most recent earnings of a retiring worker that are usually higher than the life-time average.  
3 Using the same replacement rate concept as in footnote 2.  
4 At least 35 years. 
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Euro, representing 21 percent of public spending, and 11.8 percent of GDP. It is the second 
largest pension budget in the OECD, surpassed only by Italy (14.2 percent of GDP). It is more 
than 2.5 times as expensive as the U.S. Social Security System (4.4 percent of GDP).5 
While the generosity of the German public pension system is considered a great social 
achievement, negative incentive effects and, most importantly, population aging is threatening 
the very core of the pension system. All industrialized countries are aging, however, Germany 
– together with Italy and Japan – will experience a particular dramatic change in the age 
structure of the population. The severity of the demographic transition has two causes: a 
quicker increase in life expectancy than elsewhere, partly due to a relatively low level still in 
the 1970s, and a more incisive baby boom/baby bust transition (e.g., relative to the United 
States) to a very low fertility rate of 1.3 children per women, only a bit higher than the rock-
bottom fertility rate of 1.2 in Italy and Spain. Consequently, the ratio of elderly to working age 
persons – the old age dependency ratio – will increase steeply. According to the latest OECD 
projections, the share of elderly (aged 65 and above) will exceed a quarter of the population in 
2030, and the German old age dependency ratio will almost double from 24.0 percent in 2000 
to 43.3 percent in 2030.6 (See Figure 1) 
                                                 
5 OECD (2001). 
6 OECD (2001). The OECD dependency ratio relates persons age 65 and older to persons between ages 15 and 64. 
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Figure 1: Development of the Economic Dependency Ratio 
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Note: Economic dependency ratio here as number of equivalence pensioners/ number of equivalence contributors. 
Source: Data supplied by the Rürup commission. 
 
The increase in the dependency ratio has immediate consequences for a pay-as-you-go social 
insurance system because fewer workers have to finance the benefits of more recipients. The 
German social security contribution rate, in 2003 at 19.5 percent of gross income, was 
projected at the end of the 1980s to exceed 40 percent of gross income at the peak of 
population ageing in 2035 if the accustomed replacement rates and the indication of pensions 
to gross income were maintained.7 This lead to a major pension reform in 1992. This reform 
abolished the indexation of pensions to gross wages in favor of net wages. While this is still 
more generous than indexation to costs of living (such as in the U.S.), it was an important 
move away from the destabilizing feedback loop in which pensions increased when taxes and 
contributions increased. In addition, the 1992 reform introduced adjustments of benefits to 
early retirement age and abolished the “window of retirement” for all but those who have long 
service lifes. Benefit adjustments are however not fully actuarial and changes in mandatory 
retirement ages are being introduced with a very long delay. First cohorts started experiencing 
these adjustments in 1997; the adjustments will be fully phased in by 2017. 
                                                 
7 Prognos (1989). 
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It became quickly clear that the 1992 reform was too little and too late to put the German 
system on a stable path. Another “parametric” reform due to become law in 1999 failed after a 
change in government in 1998, but the then secretary of labor Walter Riester succeeded to pass 
a major reform bill through parliament in 2001. This reform bed farewell to the pure pay-as-
you-go system and introduced a multipillar pension system with a small, but growing funded 
pillar. The new system will be fully phased in about 2050, but its main implications will be felt 
from 2011 onwards. 
Future reforms are likely.8 None of the reforms so far touched the normal retirement which is 
at age 65. This may come as a surprise, since in the light of a prolonged life span, increasing 
the active part of it appears to be a rather natural reform option, in particularly since it 
simultaneously increases the number of contributors and decreases the number of beneficiaries 
and because age-specific morbidity rates appear to have shifted in line with mortality.9 As 
noted before, average, median and modal retirement age was about 60 years in 2002, the 
earliest eligibility age for old-age pensions and more than 5 years younger than the so-called 
“normal” retirement age in Germany. In late fall of 2002, the government established a reform 
commission for “sustainability in financing the social insurance systems”, popularly called 
“Rürup commission”. It has delivered concrete proposals in August 2003. Further cuts in the 
replacement rate of the pay-as-you-go pillar and an increase in the normal retirement age are 
two important elements of the new reform package. 
This paper is structured as follows. Part A (Sections 2 and 3) describes the institutional 
background for private sector and civil servants’ pensions as they shaped the retirement 
behavior from 1972 until the end of the nineties. Part B (Sections 4, 5 and 6) describes and 
assesses the past and current reform process, culminating in the “Riester reform” of 2001 and 
continuing now with the efforts of the Rürup commission. Section 7 concludes with the 
question whether the 1992-2001 reforms and the current reform proposals will solve the 
problems of the German pension system. Our answer is unequivocal: there is further work to be 
done in order to stabilize the German pension system. 
                                                 
8 See Börsch-Supan (1998, 2000a) and Schnabel (1998) for descriptions of the problems, and Birg and Börsch-
Supan (1999) and Börsch-Supan (2001) for concrete reform proposals. 
9 Cutler and Sheiner (1998). 
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Part A: The German Public Pension System How it Was 
The core of the German public pension system provides pensions to all private and public 
sector employees. We simply and somewhat loosely refer to this core system as “public 
pensions” or “private sector pensions” and describe it in section 2. In addition, civil servants – 
about 7 percent of the workforce – have their own pay-as-you-go system which we describe in 
section 3. Self-employed – about 9 percent of the work force – can participate in the public 
system (some trade associations make this mandatory) or self-insure. We largely ignore their 
special status in our description. 
2 Private Sector Pensions  
In this section we describe the 1972-2000 situation of the German “public retirement 
insurance” (“Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung”, GRV) which covers about 85 percent of the 
German workforce.10  Most of these are private sector workers but the GRV also includes those 
public sector workers who are not civil servants. For the average German retiree, occupational 
pensions do not play a major role in providing old-age income. Neither do individual 
retirement accounts, but there are important exceptions from this general picture. Broadly 
speaking, the German pension system – as it was created in 1972 and as it shapes the current 
retirees’ income – is a monolith. This will change due to the reform described in Part B. Some 
typical features of the German system, however, such as the benefit formula strictly linked to 
lifetime income and the resulting minor role of redistribution in the German pension system, 
will remain after the recent reforms. 
2.1 Coverage and contributions 
The German public pension system features a very broad mandatory coverage of workers. Only 
the self-employed and, until 1998, workers with earnings below the official minimum earnings 
threshold („Geringfügigkeitsgrenze,“ 15 percent of average monthly gross wage; below this 
threshold are about 5.6 percent of all workers) are not subject to mandatory coverage. 
                                                 
10 These sections are updated versions of Börsch-Supan, Schnabel, Kohnz and Mastrobuoni (2002). 
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Roughly 70 percent of the budget of the German public retirement insurance is financed by 
contributions that are administrated like a payroll tax, levied equally on employees and 
employers. Total contributions in 2003 are 19.5 percent of the first 5,100 Euro of monthly 
gross income (upper earnings threshold, „Beitragsbemessungsgrenze,“ about twice the average 
monthly gross wage).11 Technically, contributions are split evenly between employees and 
employers. Contribution rate have been steadily rising since the late 1960s, and the upper 
earnings threshold has been used as an additional financing instrument. It has increased 
considerably faster than wage growth. 
Private sector pension benefits are essentially tax-free. Pension beneficiaries do not pay 
contributions to the pension system and to unemployment insurance. However, pensioners 
have to pay the equivalent of the employees’ contribution to the mandatory health and long-
term care insurance. The equivalent of the employers’ contribution to health insurance is paid 
by the pension system. 
The remaining approximately 30 percent of the social security budget are financed by 
earmarked indirect taxes (a fixed fraction of the value-added tax and the new “eco-tax” on 
fossil fuel) and a subsidy from the federal government. The subsidy is also used to fine-tune 
the pay-as-you-go budget constraint because the system has a reserve of only about 14 days 
worth of benefits expenditures (August 2003). 
2.2 Benefit types 
The German public retirement insurance provides old-age pensions for workers aged 60 and 
older, disability benefits for workers below age 60 which are converted to old-age pensions 
latest at age 65, and survivor benefits for spouses and children. In addition, pre-retirement (i.e., 
retirement before age 60) is possible through several mechanisms using the public transfer 
system, mainly unemployment compensation. We begin by describing old-age pensions. 
                                                 
11 About 20 percent less in East Germany. 1 Euro has a purchasing power of approximately 1 US-$. 
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Eligibility for benefits and retirement age for old age pensions 
Eligibility for benefits and the minimum retirement age depend on which type of pension 
applies to the worker. The German public retirement insurance distinguishes five types of old-
age pensions, corresponding to normal retirement and four forms of early retirement. Table 1 
shows the minimum retirement age for all pension types as it was until the late nineties. 
Table 1: Old-Age Pensions (1972 Legislation) 
Pension type Retirement 
age 
Years of 
service 
Additional conditions Earnings 
test 
A Normal 65 5  No 
B: Long service life 
(„flexible“) 
63 35  Yes 
C: Women 60 15 10 of those after age 40 Yes 
D: Older disabled 60 35 Loss of at least 50 percent 
earnings capability 
(Yes) 
E: Unemployed 60 15 1.5 to 3 years of unemployment 
(has changed several times) 
Yes 
Notes:  This legislation was changed in the reform of 1992. Changes became first effective between 1997 and 
2001 (for the different pension types) and will be gradually phased in until 2017. Almost all changes will be 
effective by 2011. 
 
This complex system was introduced by the 1972 social security reform. One of the key 
provisions was the introduction of “flexible retirement” after age 63 with full benefits for 
workers with a long service history. In addition, retirement at age 60 with full benefits was 
possible for women, unemployed, and older disabled workers. “Older disabled workers” 
referred to those workers who cannot be appropriately employed for health or labor market 
reasons and are age 60 or older. There were three possibilities to claim old age disability 
benefits. One has to (1) be physically disabled to at least 50 percent, or (2) pass a strict 
earnings test, or (3) pass a much weaker earnings test. The strict earnings test is passed if the 
earnings capacity is reduced below the minimum earnings threshold for any reasonable 
occupation (about 15 percent of average gross wage) (“erwerbsunfähig,” EU). The weaker 
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earnings test is passed when no vacancies for the worker's specific job description are available 
and the worker has to face an earnings loss of at least 50 percent when changing to a different 
job (“berufsunfähig,” BU). As opposed to the disability insurance for workers below age 60 
(see below), full benefits are paid in all three cases. This definition of disability and the 
associated earnings tests have been changed as a part of the Riester Reform in 2001 and the 
term disability now applies in general only to health and no longer to labor market reasons.12 
Due to the 1992 social security reform and its subsequent modifications, the age limits of early 
retirement will gradually be raised to age 65. These changes will be fully phased in by the year 
2017, almost all changes, however, will be effective by 2011. The only distinguishing feature 
of types B and C of “early retirement” will then be the possibility to retire up to three years 
earlier than age 65 if a sufficient number of service years (currently 35 years) has been 
accumulated. As opposed to the pre-1992 regulations, benefits will be adjusted to a retirement 
age below age 65 in a fashion that will be described below. 
Old age pension benefits 
Benefits are strictly work-related. The German system does not have benefits for spouses like 
in the U.S.13 Benefits are computed on a lifetime basis and adjusted according to the type of 
pension and the retirement age. They are the product of four elements: (1) the so-called 
“earning points” (EP) that reflect the employee’s relative earnings position, (2) the years of 
service life (SY), (3) adjustment factors (AF) for pension type and (since the 1992 reform) 
retirement age, and (4) a reference pension value – the “current pension value” (PV). The 
annual value of a pension Pt,i in year t for pensioner i is thus computed as follows: 
Pt,i  =  EPi  SYi  AFi  PVt   
The first three factors make up the “personal pension base” while the fourth factor determines 
the income distribution between workers and pensioners in general. The combination of the 
first three factors is unique for the German pension system and provides a strong link between 
lifetime income and pension benefits. Hence, redistribution plays only a minor role in the 
                                                 
12 There are still exceptions as a consequence of case law spoken by the labor courts. 
13 There are, of course, survivor benefits. 
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German pension system. The current reform process will not change this. Rather, the cost-
cutting reforms since 1992 all concentrate on the fourth factor and redefine how changes in the 
average earnings by workers affect the average pension. 
Earning points (EP). They are expressed as a multiple of the average annual contribution 
(roughly speaking, the relative income position) in each working year: one EP corresponds to 
average earnings, 0.5 EP to 50 percent of average earnings, and 2 EP to earnings twice as large 
as average earnings in one year. 
Years of service life (SY). They comprise years of active contributions plus years of 
contributions on behalf of the employee and years that are counted as service years even when 
no contributions were made at all. These include, for instance, years of unemployment, years of 
military service, three years for each child’s education for one of the parents, some allowance 
for advanced education etc., introducing a first element of redistribution. The official 
government computations such as the official replacement rate („Rentenniveau“) assume a 45-
year contribution history for what is deemed a „normal earnings history“ („Eckrentner“). In 
fact, the average number of years of contributions is about 38 years. Unlike to the U.S., there is 
neither an upper bound of years entering the benefit calculation, nor can workers choose 
certain years in their earnings history and drop others. 
Adjustment factors (AF). Depending on the pension type different AF with values between 
0.25 and 1 apply. 
Current pension value (PV). The PV is indexed to the annual changes in the level of wages 
and salaries net of pension contributions and thus enables pensioners to share in the rising 
prosperity generated by the economy. This link between changes in workers’ earnings and 
pensioners’ benefits is specified as a “benefit indexation formula”. Typical for the philosophy 
of the German public pension system, this mathematical formula is verbatim part of the law. 
The stability of this formula has created a sense of actuarial fairness, so that workers perceived 
the contributions largely as insurance premia. However, this has changed when the formula 
was altered several times since 1992. Until 1992 pensions were indexed to gross wages, 
between 1992 and 1998 to net wages and in 1999 and 2000 to the respective previous year’s 
rate of inflation. The perception of discretionary changes, and the prospect of further 
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reductions in the pension generosity has led to a great deal of dissatisfaction with the German 
pension system, in particularly among younger workers. Surveys show that by 2001, 
contributions were largely perceived as taxes.14  Nonetheless and inevitably, changes in the 
benefit indexation formula are one of the main elements of the current cost-cutting reforms. 
The indexation to the average net labor income from 1992 until 1998 solved some of the 
problems that were created by indexation to gross wages between 1972 and 1992. 
Nevertheless, wage rather than cost of living indexation makes it impossible to finance the 
retirement burden by productivity gains. 
The PV has provided a generous benefit level for middle-income earnings. The net replacement 
rate for a worker with a 45-year contribution history was 70.5 percent in 1998. For the average 
worker with 38 years of contributions, it is reduced in proportion to 59.5 percent.  
Unlike to the U.S., the German pension system has only little redistribution as is obvious from 
the benefit computation.15 The low replacement rates for high incomes result from the upper 
limit to which earnings are subject to social security contributions – they correspond to a 
proportionally lower effective contribution rate. The only element of redistribution in the 
individual benefit computation formula was introduced in 1972 when this multiple could not 
fall below 75 percent for contributions before 1972 provided a worker had a service life of at 
least 35 years. A similar rule was introduced in the 1992 reform: for contributions between 
1973 and 1992, multiples below 75 percent are multiplied by 1.5 up to the maximum of 75 
percent, effectively reducing the redistribution for workers with income positions below 50 
percent. In 2001, this system has been abolished in favor of a guaranteed minimum pension 
(“Grundsicherung”) at the level of social assistance plus 15 percent. 
Before 1992, adjustment of benefits to retirement age was only implicit via SY. Because 
benefits are proportional to the SY, a worker with fewer SY will get lower benefits. With a 
constant income profile and 40 SY, each year of earlier retirement decreased pension benefits 
by 2.5 percent, and vice versa. The 1992 social security reform will change this gradually, see 
below. Age 65 will then act as the “pivotal age” for benefit computations. For each year of 
                                                 
14 Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001). 
15 See Casmir (1989) for a comparison. 
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earlier retirement, up to five years and if the appropriate conditions in Table 1 are met, benefits 
will be reduced by 3.6 percent (in addition to the effect of fewer service years). The 1992 
reform also introduced rewards for later retirement in a systematic way. For each year of 
retirement postponed past the mandatory retirement age, the pension is increased by 5 percent 
in addition to the “natural“ increase by the number of service years. 
Table 2 displays the retirement-age-specific adjustments for a worker who has earnings that 
remain constant after age 60. The table relates the retirement income for retirement at age 65 
(normalized to 100 percent) to the retirement income for retirement at earlier or later ages, and 
compares the implicit adjustments after 1972 with the total adjustments after the 1992 social 
security reform is fully phased in. As references, the table also displays the corresponding 
adjustments in the United States and actuarially fair adjustments at a 3 percent discount rate.16 
Table 2: Adjustment of Public Pensions by Retirement Age 
 Pension as a percentage of the pension that one would obtain if one had 
retired at age 65 
 Germany United States Actuarially  
Age pre-1992a) post-1992b) pre-1983c) post-1983d) faire) 
62 100.0 89.2 80.0 77.8 80,5 
63 100.0 92.8 86.7 85.2 86,3 
64 100.0 96.4 94.4 92.6 92,8 
65 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 
66 107.2 106.0 103.0 105.6 108,1 
67 114.4 112.0 106.0 111.1 117,2 
68 114.4 118.0 109.0 120.0 127,4 
69 114.4 124.0 112.0 128.9 139,1 
Notes:  a) GRV 1972–1992.  b) GRV after 1992 reform has fully phased in.  c) US-Social Security (OASDHI) until 
1983.  d) US-Social Security after 1983 Social Security Reform has fully phased in.  e) Evaluated at a 3 percent 
discount rate, 1992/94 mortality risks of West-German males and an annual increase in net pensions of 1 percent. 
Sources: Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999). 
 
                                                 
16 The actuarially fair adjustments equalize the expected social security wealth for a worker with an earnings 
history starting at age 20. A higher discount rate yields steeper adjustments. 
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While neither the German nor the American system were actuarially fair prior to the reforms, 
the public retirement system in Germany as enacted in 1972 was particularly distortive. There 
was less economic incentive for Americans to retire before age 65 and only a small 
disincentive to retire later than at age 65 after the 1983 Reform, while the German social 
security system tilted the retirement decision heavily towards the earliest retirement age 
applicable. The 1992 reform has diminished but not abolished this incentive effect. 
Disability and survivor benefits 
The contributions to the German retirement insurance also finance disability benefits to 
workers of all ages and survivor benefits to spouses and children. In order to be eligible for 
disability benefits, a worker must pass one of the two earnings tests described earlier for the 
old-age disability pension. If the stricter earnings test is passed, full benefits are paid 
(„Erwerbsunfähigkeitsrente,“ EU). If only the weaker earnings test is passed and some 
earnings capability remains, disability pensions before age 60 are only two-thirds of the 
applicable old age pension („Berufsunfähigkeitsrente,“ BU). In the 1970s and early 1980s, the 
German jurisdiction has interpreted both rules very broadly, in particular the applicability of 
the first rule. Moreover, jurisdiction also overruled the earnings test during disability 
retirement. This lead to a share of EU-type disability pensions of more than 90 percent of all 
disability pensions. Because both rules were used as a device to keep unemployment rates 
down, their generous interpretation has only recently, in the context of the Riester reform, lead 
to stricter legislation.17 
Survivor pensions are 60 percent (after 2001: 55 percent) of the husband’s applicable pension 
for spouses that are age 45 and over or if children are in the household („große Witwenrente“), 
otherwise 25 percent („kleine Witwenrente“). Survivor benefits are therefore a large component 
of the public pension budget and of total pension wealth. Certain earnings tests apply if the 
surviving spouse has her own income, e.g., her own pension. This is only relevant for a very 
small (below 10 percent) share of widows. As mentioned before, the German system does not 
have a married couple supplement for spouses of beneficiaries. However, most wives acquire 
                                                 
17 See Riphahn (1995) for an analysis of disability rules. 
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their own pension by active and passive contribution (mostly years of advanced education and 
years of child education). 
2.3 Pre-retirement 
In addition to benefits through the public pension system, transfer payments (mainly 
unemployment compensation) enable what is referred to as „pre-retirement“. Labor force exit 
before age 60 is frequent: about 45 percent of all men call themselves „retired“ at age 59. Only 
about half of them retire because of disability; the other 50 percent make use of one of the 
many official and unofficial pre-retirement schemes. 
Unemployment compensation has been used as pre-retirement income in an unofficial scheme 
that induced very early retirement. Before workers could enter the public pension system at age 
60, they were paid a negotiable combination of unemployment compensation and a supplement 
or severance pay. At age 60, a pension of type E (see Table 1) could start. As the rules of 
pensions of type E and the duration of unemployment benefits changed, so did the “unofficial” 
retirement ages. Age 56 was particularly frequent in West Germany because unemployment 
compensation is paid up to three years for elderly workers; it is followed by the lower 
unemployment aid. Earlier retirement ages could be induced by paying the worker the 
difference between the last salary and unemployment compensation for three years; and for 
further years the difference between the last salary and unemployment aid – it all depended on 
the so-called „social plan“ which a firm would negotiate with the workers before restructuring 
the work force. 
In addition, early retirement at age 58 was made possible in an official pre-retirement scheme 
(“Vorruhestand”), in which the employer received a subsidy from the unemployment insurance 
if a younger employee was hired. While the first (and unofficial) pre-retirement scheme was 
very popular and a convenient way to overcome the strict German labor laws, few employers 
used the official second scheme. 
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2.4 Retirement behavior 
The retirement behavior of entrants into the German public retirement insurance system is 
summarized by Figure 2. It shows the uptake of the various pathways to old-age pensions18, 
including the disability pathway, (adding to 100 percent on the vertical axis) and their changes 
over time (marked on the horizontal axis), mostly in response to benefit adjustments and 
administrative rule changes, in particularly the tightening of the disability screening process. 
The fraction of those who enter retirement through a disability pension has declined and was 
29 percent in 1998. Only about 20 percent of all entrants used the “normal” pathway of an old-
age pension at age 65. 
Figure 2: Pathways to Retirement, 1960-1995 
Pathways to retirement - males
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c
Source: Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1999). 
 
The average retirement age in 1998 was 59.7 years for men and 60.7 years for women. These 
numbers refer to West Germany. In the East, retirement age was 57.9 years for men and 58.2 
years for women. The average retirement age has dramatically declined after the 1972 reform, 
                                                 
18 See Jacobs, Kohli and Rein (1990) for this concept. 
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see Figure 3. We interpret this as a clear sign of a policy reaction, in particular, since it does 
not coincide with labor demand effects generated by the rise in unemployment.19 The most 
popular retirement age is age 60, see Figure 4. The close correspondence to the pathways in 
Table 1 is another clear sign for a behavioral response to the incentives created by the pension 
system, and in particular the change of the peaks and spikes after the 1972 reform.20 
Figure 3: Average Retirement Age, 1960-1995 
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
-1
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
Retirement Age
Unemployment Rate
Unempl.R.(50-55)
 
Note: „Retirement Age“ is the average age of all new entries into the public pension system.  „Unemployment 
rate“ is the general national unemployment rate. „Unempl.R.(50-55)“ refers to male unemployed age 50-55. 
Source: VDR 1997 and BMA 1997. 
 
                                                 
19 See Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998). 
20 See Börsch-Supan (2000c). 
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Figure 4: Distribution of Retirement Ages, 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1995 
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Source: Verband deutscher Rentenversicherungsträger (VDR), 1997. 
 
3 Civil Service Pensions 
Civil servants are exempted from the public pension system described in section 2. They do not 
pay explicit contributions for their pensions as the other employees in the private and public 
sectors do.21  Instead, the “gross” wage for civil servants is lower than the gross wage of other 
public sector employees with a comparable education. Civil servants acquire pension claims 
that are considerably more generous than those described in the previous section, and they have 
rather distinctive early retirement incentives. While the private sector pensions described above 
have undergone an incisive reform process (see Part B), civil servants have largely been 
protected from benefit cuts so far. 
                                                 
21 Civil servants are also exempt from unemployment insurance contributions, since civil servants have a life-time 
job guarantee. The government pays a certain fraction of health expenses of the civil servant and his or her 
dependents (ranging from 50 to 80 percent). The rest has to be covered by private insurance. 
19 
3.1 Eligibility: pathways to retirement for civil servants 
There are three pathways for civil servants: the standard, the early, and the disability 
retirement option. The standard retirement age is 65. Before July 1, 1997 the early retirement 
age for civil servants was 62 and thus one year less than the early retirement age for workers 
with a long service life in the social security system. In 1997 early retirement age was raised to 
63. Discount factors for early retirement are phasing in linearly between the years 1998 and 
2003, and will reach 0.3 percentage points per month of early retirement, the same as in the 
private sector and substantially smaller than actuarially fair.22 
Filing for disability is a third pathway to retirement for civil servants. In the case of disability a 
civil servant receives a pension which is based on his or her previous salary. The replacement 
rate depends on the number of service years reached before disability retirement and the 
number of service years that could potentially have been accumulated until age 60. For those 
who did not reach the maximum replacement rate before disability, one additional year of 
service raises the replacement rate by only 1/3 percentage point per year. 
3.2 Computation of pensions 
The standard pension benefit for civil servants is the product of three elements: (1) the last 
gross earnings level, (2) the replacement rate as function of service years, and (3) the new 
adjustment factors to early retirement. There are three crucial differences between civil 
servants pensions and private sector benefits. First, the benefit base is gross rather than net 
income as it was in the private sector between 1992 and 1998. In turn, civil servants’ pensions 
are taxed like any other income. Finally, the benefit base is the last salary rather than the 
lifetime average. 
Last gross earnings level. Benefits are anchored to the earnings in the last position and then 
updated annually by the growth rate of the net earnings of active civil servants. If the last 
position was reached within the last two years before retirement, the pension is based on the 
previous, lower position. Due to the difference in the benefit base, gross pensions of civil 
                                                 
22 Very specific rules apply to some civil servants. E.g., the regular retirement age for police officers is age 60; for 
soldiers it is even lower and depends on their rank. 
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servants are approximately 25 percent higher (other things being equal) than in the private 
sector. 
Replacement rate. The maximum replacement rate is 75 percent of gross earnings which is 
considerably higher than the official replacement rate of the private sector system which is 
around 70 percent of net earnings. The replacement rate depends on the years of service. High 
school and college education, military service, and other work in the public sector are also 
counted as service years. For retirement after June 1997 the college education credit is limited 
to 3 years. 
Before 1992 the replacement rate was a non-linear function of service years. The replacement 
rate started at a value of 35 percent for all civil servants with at least 5 years of service. For 
each additional year of service between the 10th and the 25th year the increment was 2 
percentage points. From the 25th to the 35th year the annual increment was one percent. Thus, 
the maximum replacement rate of 75 percent was reached with 35 service years under the old 
rule. This is much more generous than the private sector replacement rate of 70 percent which 
requires 45 years of service. 
New adjustment factors to early retirement. For persons retiring after January 1, 1992 the 
replacement rate grows by 1.875 percentage points for each year of service. Thus, the 
maximum value is reached after 40 years of service. However, there are transitional 
modifications to that simple rule. First, civil servants who reach the standard retirement age 
(usually age 65) before January 1, 2002 are not affected at all. Second, for younger civil 
servants, all claims that have been acquired before 1992 are conserved. These persons gain one 
additional percentage point per year from 1992 on. All persons who have acquired 25 service 
years before 1992 have reached 65 percentage points and would also have gained only one 
additional point per year under the old rule. Only persons with less than 25 service years in 
1991 can be made worse off by the reform. The new proportional rule only applies if it 
generates a higher replacement rate than the transitional rule. 
The generosity of gross pensions received by civil servants vis-à-vis the private sector workers 
is only partially offset by the preferential tax treatment of private sector pensions. Since civil 
servants’ pensions are taxed according to the German comprehensive income taxation, the net 
replacement rates of civil service pension recipients depends on their position in the highly 
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progressive tax schedule. In general, the net replacement rate with respect to the pre-retirement 
net earnings is higher than 75 percent and thus considerably more generous than in the private 
sector. 
3.3 Incentives to retire 
Currently, most civil servants reach the maximum replacement rate by the age of 54. Persons 
who have started to work in the public sector before the age of 23 have reached a replacement 
rate of 75 percent when taking into account the disability rules. This also holds for civil 
servants, who – like professors – receive lifetime tenure late in their life cycle. For those 
groups the starting age is usually set to age 21. Additional years of service beyond the age of 
54 increase pensions only if the civil servant is promoted to a position with a higher salary. 
Retirement incentives therefore strongly depend on promotion expectations. 
For persons who cannot expect to be promoted after age 54 the pension accrual is zero or very 
small. For those who have already reached the replacement rate of 75 percent, the accrual of 
the present discounted pension wealth is negative. Since the replacement rate is 75 percent of 
the gross earnings in the last position before retirement, the negative accrual of postponing 
retirement by one year is simply 75 percent of the last gross earnings. This is equivalent to a 75 
percent tax on earnings. 
For persons who expect to climb another step in the hierarchy the gross wage increase is on 
average 10.5 percent. This raises the pension by approximately 10 percent. In order to cash in 
the higher pension, the civil servant has to defer retirement by at least one year.23 In this 
extreme case the social security wealth increases 10 percent through the effect of higher 
pensions and decreases by 5 percent through the effect of pension deferral. In this extreme case 
the pension accrual is positive. If the civil servant has to wait several years for the next 
promotion (or for the promotion to have an effect on pension claims) the accrual of working 
becomes negative; hence, it makes no financial sense to keep working. 
                                                 
23 For the higher earnings to take effect on pensions it is usually required to work several years after the 
promotion.  
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3.4 Retirement behavior 
The retirement behavior of civil servants reflects the very generous disability and early 
retirement rules. The average retirement age for civil servants in the year 1993 was age 58.9 
and thus about one year lower than in the private sector. Disability is the most important 
pathway to retirement for civil servants: 40 percent of those who retired in the year 1993 used 
disability retirement. Almost one third used the early retirement option at the age of 62. Only 
about 20 percent of civil servants retired at the regular retirement age of 65. 
Part B: The German Public Pension System How it Will Be 
4 The German Pension Reform Process 
Three dates mark the pension reform process so far: 1992 and 2001 have seen two major 
pension reforms, and a reform due to become law in 1999 failed after the 1998 elections. In 
addition, there was a constant flurry of smaller adjustments in between. 
4.1 The 1992 Reform 
The main changes in the 1992 reform were to anchor benefits to net rather than to gross wages. 
This implicitly has reduced benefits since taxes and social security contributions have 
increased, reducing net relative to gross wages. This mechanism will become particularly 
important when population aging will speed up since it implies an implicit mechanism of 
burden sharing between generations. The other important element in the 1992 reform was the 
introduction of adjustments to benefits and an increase in the “normal” retirement ages for all 
pension types, except disability pensions (age 63), to 65. These changes have been described in 
Subsection 2.2. They will reduce incentives to retire early, although the “actuarial” adjustments 
are not actuarially fair except for very low discount rates. 
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4.2 The 1999 Reform 
The 1999 pension reform was supposed to lower the replacement rate according to a pre-
specified so-called demographic factor, a function of life expectancy plus several “correction 
factors”. It was revoked after the change of government in 1998. A side effect of this reform, 
which was not revoked, was a gradual change of eligibility ages for pensions for women and 
unemployed (types C and E in Table 1) from age 60 to age 65. This change will be fully 
implemented by 2017 and effectively leave a “window of retirement” for healthy workers only 
if they have at least 35 years of service. Figure 5 depicts the new eligibility regulations and 
adjustment paths for the various pension types described before in Table 1. 
Figure 5: Retirement age with and without “actuarial” adjustments (1992 and 1999 
reforms) 
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4.3 The Riester Reform in 2001 
On May 11, 2001 a new pension reform act was ratified in Germany, popularly referred to as 
the “Riester reform” after the then labor minister Walter Riester. The 2001 reform is a major 
change in the system. It will change the monolithic German system of old-age provision to a 
genuine multi-pillar system. The most important aspect of the reform, which came into effect 
on January 1, 2002, is a partial substitution of pay-as-you-go financed pensions by funded 
pensions. The reform aimed to achieve three main objectives: 
(1) Sustainable contribution rates 
The key objective of the Riester reform was to stabilize contribution rates and thus (a) to 
limit further increases in non-wage labor costs and (b) to achieve a fairer balance of 
intergenerational burdens. The law actually states that contribution rates to the public 
retirement insurance scheme must stay below 20 percent until 2020 and below 22 percent 
until 2030 while the net replacement rate must stay above 67 percent. Failure must 
precipitate government action. 
(2) Secure the long-term stability of pension levels 
Pensions will be gradually reduced from the current level of 70 percent of average net 
earnings to around 67–68 percent by the year 2030. At the same time, however, the Riester 
reform changed the computational procedure for the reference earnings, now subtracting a 
fictitious 4 percent of gross earning to be invested into the new funded supplementary 
private pensions. In comparison with the definition of net earnings which applied prior to 
the reform, this means that actual PAYG pension levels will fall by a larger margin (by 
some 10 percent to about 63.5 percent) than suggested by the new definition. 
(3) Spread of supplementary private pension savings 
The decline in public pensions is expected to be offset by supplementary (occupational and 
private) pensions. In order to achieve this aim, supplementary pensions are subsidized, 
either by tax deferral and tax deduction, or by direct subsidies to individual and 
occupational pension plans. These supplementary pensions are, however, not mandated. 
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Table 3 gives an overview over the main changes. Subsection 4.4 describes how costs in the 
PAYG pillar are cut. The other changes within the first pillar will not be discussed in detail 
here. Subsection 4.5 introduces the subsidies for the private supplementary funded pensions 
and subsection 4.6 describes the changes in occupational pensions which both are supposed to 
fill the emerging pension gap. An assessment of the likely economic success of the Riester 
reform follows in section 5. 
Table 3: Overview of the core elements of the Riester–Reform 
Measure Content Pillar 
Introduction of a needs-
oriented basic income 
Minimum social security guarantee for old age; 
reduction in earning capacity secured by means of 
needs-oriented basic income 
0 
New adjustment formula Reduction in pension level by about 10 percent 1 
Abolition of occupational 
incapacity pensions 
Discontinuation of occupational incapacity pensions; 
replacement by two-tier general invalidity pension 
1 
Reform of women’s and 
survivors’ pensions 
Modification of income rules for survivors’ pensions; 
introduction of “pension splitting for married couples”
1 
Reformed framework for 
occupational pensions 
Introduction of a legal right to convert salary into 
pension contributions; relaxation of investing rules; 
introduction of pension funds; DC-plans permitted 
2 
Establishment of funded 
(voluntary) supplementary 
pension provision 
Introduction of individual retirement accounts; rules 
for the recognition of financial services products 
eligible for state subsidies (Retirement Pension 
Contracts Certification Act); provision of state 
subsidy; introduction of deferred taxation 
3 
Source: Authors compilation 
4.4 The PAYG pillar: reducing the replacement rate 
The calculation of the current monthly pension value PVt for a specific year t takes account of 
the development of the earnings of all workers, see section 2.2. This procedure is intended to 
guarantee that the so called “standard pension replacement rate” remains stable and does not 
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fall behind the development of current average earnings.24  Before the 2001 reform, the 
objective of safeguarding standards of living in old age was considered to be met if pensions 
were worth 70 percent of average net earnings. Thus they more than maintain the purchasing 
power of the level of pension entitlements acquired when a person retires. Until the 2001 
reform, the German pension system was essentially run by adapting the contribution rate to this 
70 percent standard replacement rate. 
Starting with 2001, a rather complex new adjustment formula has been effective, which relates 
changes in the pension value (PVt) to lagged changes in gross income (AGIt), modified by the 
actual contribution rate to public pensions (τt) and a fictitious contribution rate to the new 
private pension accounts (AVAt), gradually increasing from 0.5 percent in 2003 to 4 percent in 
2009. In addition, the somewhat awkward „sensitivity factor“ dt is 100 until 2010, then 
decreases to 90 which effectively increases the sensitivity of PV to increases in τ after 2010. 
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The complex design of the formula reflects the balance between the two opposing aims of the 
reform: to keep the contribution rate below a fixed level (20 percent until 2020, 22 percent 
until 2030), and to keep the redefined standard replacement level above 67 percent until 2030. 
The awkward jump in the sensitivity factor dt reflects this objective since the system 
dependency ratio is still flat until 2010 and then quickly rises, see Figure 1. 
4.5 The new funded pillar: introducing supplementary funded pensions 
Another component of the Riester reform is the introduction and significant promotion of 
supplementary funded private pensions. The objective is to offer incentives for people to take 
out supplementary private pension cover which, in the long term, should compensate for the 
future cuts in public pensions. However, there will be no legal mandate for people to invest in 
                                                 
24 The reader is reminded that the word replacement rate may be misleading: In the German context, it does NOT 
refer to last earnings before retirement. Rather, the “standard replacement rate” refers to the pension of a worker, 
who had 45 earnings points, divided by the average net earnings off all current workers. 
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additional private schemes. It remains to be seen, how many workers actually start building up 
private pensions. 
The new pillar pensions can be occupational or individual pensions. In either case, many 
restrictions apply. They are detailed below and in section 4.6. The main restriction is on 
payment plans. Since additional private pension schemes are intended to supplement or replace 
benefits from the public pension scheme, the government decided that incentives will only be 
available for investment vehicles which guarantee payment of a life annuity payable from the 
date of retirement. Investment vehicles which provide for disbursement of benefits in a single 
payment are not subject to state subsidies.25 This restriction has already met with considerable 
criticism in the public debate as it excludes other forms of provision for old age (such as 
investments in old-age or nursing homes). 
The incentives provided by the state can take two forms: direct savings subsidies or tax-
deductible special allowances. The tax authorities automatically compute which of the two 
forms versions is most advantageous. 
Direct savings subsidy. All dependently employed and certain self employed workers who 
pay personal contributions to a certified retirement pension policy are entitled to receive a 
direct retirement savings subsidy. The subsidy is paid directly into the beneficiary’s saving 
account. A basic subsidy and a child subsidy for each child for which child benefits were 
received during the previous year is paid. Child subsidies are payable to the mother. In the case 
of married couples, both partners receive a basic subsidy if they have each taken out their own 
supplementary private pension policy. In addition, non-entitled partners (such as mothers not in 
paid employment) are also entitled to receive the full subsidy for their own retirement pension 
policy provided that the respective married partner subject to compulsory insurance 
contributions has paid his or her minimum personal contribution to their supplementary 
retirement pension policy (see below). 
                                                 
25 If a lump-sum payment is chosen, all subsidies have to be reimbursed to the tax authorities. 
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Table 4: Direct savings subsidies 
From … on Savings rate Basic subsidy in 
Euro/Year 
Child subsidy 
in Euro/Year 
2002 1 percent 38 46 
2004 2 percent 76 92 
2006 3 percent 114 138 
2008 4 percent 154 185 
Table 4 shows the maximum incentive subsidies available as of 2002. In order to qualify for 
the maximum subsidy the beneficiary must invest a specified percentage of his or her gross 
earnings (denoted as “saving rate”). This percentage increases until 2008 in four steps 
(“Riester-Treppe”). The percentage is applied to the actual earnings level, capped at the same 
cap as the PAYG contributions are (about 2 times average earnings). If less money is invested, 
the state subsidy is reduced accordingly. The scheme is complicated by the fact, that the 
subsidy is included in the savings amount. Hence, the actual saving rate necessary for the 
maximum subsidy is lower than the percentages indicated in the second column of Table 4. In 
turn, certain minimum amounts are necessary, see Table 5. 
Table 5: Minimum Savings 
Year No child One child Two or more children
2002 – 2004 45 38 30 
As of 2005 90 75 60 
Tax deductible special expenses. Alternatively, qualifying retirement savings can be deducted 
as “special allowances” from income taxes. This is usually more advantageous for workers 
with higher than average earnings. Saving rates, caps etc. are the same as in the subsidy case. 
Table 6 shows the maximum tax-deductible contributions to private retirement savings 
accounts. 
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Table 6: Maximum Savings 
From … on Tax deductible special expenses in Euro/Year 
2002 525 
2004 1.050 
2006 1.575 
2008 2.100 
Criteria for individual pension plans eligible for subsidies/tax relief. Individual retirement 
accounts only qualify for state promotion if they meet criteria laid down in the new 
Certification of Retirement Pension Contracts Act (“AltZertG”). It contains a long list of rules 
which make the system complex for customers and potential insurers alike, see section 5. 
Qualifying pension plans require certification by the Federal Financial Markets Authority 
(“Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungs- und Finanzmarktaufsicht”) which will be granted 
automatically if they fulfill the following preconditions: 
1. The investor must be committed to making regular, voluntary pension contributions. 
2. Pension benefits may only be paid out when the beneficiary reaches the age of 60 at the 
earliest or upon reaching retirement age. 
3. At the beginning of the disbursement phase, the accrued pension contributions 
(inclusive of subsidies) must be guaranteed (i.e., the nominal rate of return must be 
nonnegative). 
4. Pension payments must guarantee lifelong benefits which retain or increase their 
nominal value, i.e. in the form of a life annuity or disbursement plan linked to lifelong 
annual installments. 
5. The disbursement plan must continue to provide benefits until the beneficiary reaches 
the age of 85 and subsequently provide a life annuity guaranteed by the capital 
available at the beginning of the disbursement phase. 
6. Supplementary survivor’s coverage must not have features which offset the original 
plan. 
7. Initial commission and administrative charges must be spread equally over a period of 
at least 10 years. 
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8. The investor must be informed about the following issues before taking out the policy: 
The level and distribution over time of commission and administrative costs, the cost of 
switching to a different policy, the costs of financial management, the costs involved in 
changing to a different insurer. 
9. The investor must be informed once a year during the term of the policy about how his 
or her contributions are being used, capital formation, costs and yields, and also about 
whether and to what extent the insurer takes account of ethical, social and ecological 
investment criteria. 
10. The investor must have the right to suspend contributions during the saving phase, to 
allow the policy to continue running without making additional contributions, or to 
terminate the policy by serving three months notice to the end of the quarter. 
11. Policy rights may not be assigned or transferred to third parties. Claims to pension 
benefits cannot, as a result, be bequeathed. 
Products eligible for subsidy support and into which old-age pension contributions and the 
proceeds on such contributions may be invested include pension insurance and capitalization 
products, bank accounts with accumulated interest and shares in growth and distributing 
investment funds. These products are offered by life insurance companies, banks, capital 
investment companies, financial services institutions and securities services companies. 
Deferred taxation. While old-age pension contributions will be tax exempt during the saving 
phase, pension payments during the benefit phase will be taxed in full as normal income. This 
applies to all benefits regardless of whether these accrue from contributions, subsidies or 
capital gains. One may regard this as another form of subsidy, since taxes occur later in life 
(hence, an implicit tax credit) and usually at a lower rate due to progressivity.26 
                                                 
26 Börsch-Supan and Lührmann (2000). The “tax credit” feature depends on the an income or consumption tax 
point of view. 
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4.6 State promotion of occupational pension schemes 
The Riester reform remained largely undecided on the role of occupational pensions versus 
individual accounts. Traditionally, occupational pensions have played a minor role in 
Germany, particularly in comparison with other countries. Demand for participation in 
occupational pension schemes has also been falling in recent years.27 On the other hand, 
occupational pensions may provide a psychological substitute for mandated private pensions. 
In order to strengthen occupational pensions, additional (implicit and explicit) subsidies were 
introduced with the Riester reform. 
The most important change is the general right to convert part of the salary directly into 
contributions to pension plans. This applies regardless of whether the contributions are paid by 
the employer or the employee. Arrangements may be based both on gross or net pay. If they 
are based on net pay, there is a large implicit subsidy since the so-converted salary may not 
only be subject to deferred taxation but can also be exempt from social security contributions, 
at least until 2008. If they are based on gross pay, contributions may enjoy the same direct 
subsidies or tax relief as contributions to individual accounts, as long as the occupational 
pensions meet certain criteria which are less restrictive than the criteria for individual pension 
plans. Which contribution rules apply depends on the chosen investment vehicle and the 
incentives they attract. (See below and Table 7) Collective bargaining agreements, however, 
have precedence over the right to convert salary. This means that an employee covered by a 
binding collective agreement is only entitled to convert his or her pay into pension if this is 
explicitly provided for in the terms of the collective agreement. This rule makes sure that 
employers and unions can impose their own rules on occupational pension plans. 
Investment vehicles and eligibility for Riester subsidies/tax relief. The Riester reform also 
introduced pension funds as a vehicle for occupational pensions – an investment vehicle which 
is widely used in other countries, but was not permitted in Germany. There are now five 
different investment vehicles in German occupational pension schemes (see Table 7 for an 
overview of their features). Only three of them are eligible for Riester incentives: (1) direct 
insurance, (2) staff pension insurance and (3) pension funds. As the employer has to provide 
                                                 
27 See Ruppert (2000). 
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the employee with the possibility to benefit from the Riester incentives, this means – especially 
for smaller companies – that some companies now have to restructure their pension schemes. 
Table 7: Types of occupational pension systems 
Features Investment Vehicles 
 Direct 
pension 
promise 
(Direkt-
zusage) 
Benefit 
funds 
(Unter-
stützungs-
kasse) 
Direct 
insurance 
(Direkt-
versicherung)
Staff pension 
insurance 
(Pensions-
kasse) 
Pension funds 
(Pensions-
fonds) 
Tax on 
contribution
s 
Tax free 1. Flat-rate tax
2. Fully taxed 
but Riester 
subsidy/ tax 
deductable 
expense 
1. Flat-rate tax 
2. Fully taxed 
but Riester 
subsidy/ tax 
deductable 
expense 
3. Tax free 
until 4% of 
BMG 
1. Fully taxed 
but Riester 
subsidy/ tax 
deductable 
expense 
2. Tax free 
until 4% of 
BMG 
Tax on 
benefits 
Fully taxed 1. Tax on 
returns only 
2. Fully taxed
1. Tax on 
returns only 
2. Fully taxed 
3. Fully taxed 
1. Fully taxed 
2. Fully taxed 
Investment Internal external 
Investment 
rules 
None Acc. Insurance Supervisory 
Act 
None 
Insolvency 
scheme 
Membership in pension 
insurance fund (PSV) 
No Membership 
in PSV 
State 
supervision 
No Federal Insurance Authority 
(Bundesaufsichtsamt für das 
Versicherungswesen). 
Note: BMG = earnings threshold (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze, see section 2.1). 
Source: Author’s compilation 
33 
5 An Assessment of the Riester Reform 
Will the recent reforms, and in particular the Riester reform, solve the problems of the German 
public pension system? In subsection 5.1, we look first at the new voluntary supplementary 
private pensions, the so-called Riester pensions. Will they be accepted by the German workers 
who were used to the all-caring public system? Subsection 5.2 then asks, whether the new 
supplementary private pensions will suffice to offset the cuts in the PAYG pillar if workers 
actually participate. And finally, Subsection 5.3 poses the main question: Will the Riester 
reform put the German system of old age provision on a stable and lasting new foundation? 
5.1 Will the “Riester” pensions actually take off? 
Since the new pensions are voluntary, one of the most debated issues in the context of the 
Riester reform is the question whether workers will actually overcome the temptations to 
procrastinate. How many will build up supplementary pensions? How much will they save? At 
this point, only one year since their introduction, it is too early to tell. It took about 5 years to 
popularize a general subsidized dedicated savings program (“Vermögenswirksame Leistungen”, 
directly deducted from payroll) which now enjoys almost universal participation. In the US, 
IRAs needed at least as long to be accepted by a large share of households. In this section, we 
look at the design and the incentives in order to understand who is likely to take up the private 
Riester pensions. 
The depth of Riester incentives. Two aspects need to be taken into account when assessing 
the benefits offered by Riester incentives: the subsidies/tax exemptions during the contribution 
phase and any tax-related advantages or disadvantages which arise during the disbursement 
phase. The direct subsidies during the contribution phase are very deep for those who have 
relatively low income and those who have children. The reverse is the case for the tax-
deductible special allowances, due to the progressive tax system. Here, households with higher 
incomes benefit more. This results in a U-shaped relation between subsidies and income, 
visible in Figure 6 which shows the subsidy as a percentage of savings in form of the new 
supplementary pensions.28 
                                                 
28 We use the word “subsidy” for both the direct subsidy and the tax-deductible special allowance. 
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Figure 6: Depth of subsidies to Riester pensions 
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Note: Direct subsidy/the tax advantage as a percentage of savings in form of the new supplementary pensions. 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2002). 
 
For lowest income households, the subsidy is almost as large as the contribution itself. Even 
for the well-to-do, subsidy rates are high around 40-50 percent. Given these deep subsidies, 
uptake is likely to be high. 
The picture of Figure 6, however, is misleading insofar as this U-shaped curve is flattened out 
during the disbursement phase when pension benefits will be taxed. This flattening effect is 
due to the impact of progressive taxation. Taxation will not affect pensioners in the lower half 
of the income distribution because their pension income is below a generous exemption for 
retired households. It will, however, considerably reduce the effective lifetime subsidy to 
households with incomes above average. 
The form of the Riester incentives. While the depth of the Riester incentives makes the 
Riester pensions rather attractive, the Riester pension is less flexible than other retirement 
investment products. 
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One of the main complaints is that most of the capital has to be annuitized and can therefore 
not be used as collateral or bequeathed. The argument lacks a certain logic since the very 
objective of the Riester pensions is to provide annuity income in order to fill the pension gap 
emerging from the reduced PAYG pillar. In our opinion, the widely voiced argument is a clear 
indication that most workers have not yet realized that they will depend on the Riester pensions 
for a reasonable retirement income. 
The extensive certification requirements which severely restrict private providers’ scope to 
develop new private insurance products and which lead to higher costs is also disadvantageous. 
Certain cost items can result in total costs of up to 20 percent, compared with around 10 
percent for a normal capital sum life insurance policy.29 
What is more, the certification rules merely serve to create a formal product standard without 
creating the transparency needed in order to compare different investment vehicles and the 
relative rates of return they offer. As a result, customers are often not in a position to make 
truly informed private investment decisions. The guarantee of the nominal value of 
contributions does ensure that, on retirement, at the very least the nominal capital saved is 
available as pension capital. However, there are no rules which prescribe the sort of pension 
dynamisation which is needed in order to ensure that the value of pension benefits paid out 
from the saved capital can be maintained over the long term. Non-dynamised Riester benefits 
will very quickly lose their value, even at very modest rates of inflation. 
Preliminary evidence on take-up rates. First survey results show that demand for Riester 
products is sluggish: only around 9 percent had actually taken out a policy by mid 2002; a 
further 16 percent planned to conclude a policy by the end of 2002. By early summer 2003, 
however, the take-up rate has increased to about 35 of all eligible workers. 
This comes during a growing trend for workers to enroll in supplementary pension plans. Only 
around half of those planning to enroll in such plans are considering doing so in the framework 
of a Riester policy. The other half prefer other savings and insurance products, and/or 
occupational pensions.30 
                                                 
29 Stiftung Warentest (2002). 
30 Leinert (2002). 
36 
Moreover, many households, especially in the higher income brackets, merely may restructure 
their existing pension plans in order to reap Riester subsidies. At this point, we do not have 
much hard evidence on such substitution. Should these households have a fixed pension target, 
financing state subsidies via general taxation can actually have perverse effects which lead to a 
lower savings rate.31 
Do we need mandatory private pensions after all? Surveys have shown that a large section 
of the population would actually welcome the introduction of mandatory supplementary private 
pensions.32  This preference may be explained by savers’ lack of confidence in their ability to 
exercise the discipline needed to build up additional old-age provision by themselves and the 
fiscal externality imposed by those who speculate on general social assistance rather than save. 
The argument generally cited in favor of mandatory supplementary old-age provision are 
poverty in old age and adverse selection on the insurance market.33  Poverty in old age, 
however, is currently not an important problem in Germany. This may change in the future 
because of the benefit cuts, but has been addressed by the Riester reform through the 
introduction of the new minimum income guarantee. 
As far as adverse selection is concerned, compulsory provision could lead to a monopoly 
position being established by a single provider if this product and the offers it generates proves 
to be unattractive for smaller competitors in which case coercion would bring about even less 
rather than more product variety. 
Finally, making supplementary pensions mandatory will give the savings a tax-like character 
and therefore create negative incentive effects.34  The very idea of reducing the tax and payroll-
tax-like contribution burden in order to stimulate economic growth would be jeopardized. 
                                                 
31 See Börsch-Supan and Lührmann (2000). 
32 Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001, 2002a, b). 
33 Börsch-Supan (2002b). 
34 Summers (1989). 
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5.2 Will the “Riester” pensions fill the pension gap? 
Main point of introducing the Riester pensions was to compensate for the reductions in the 
pay-as-you-go public retirement insurance scheme. Model calculations show that an envisaged 
savings rate of 4 percent of gross income is in principle sufficient to close the gap which will 
open up in old age provision as a result of the cuts in state pensions. Figure 7 illustrates the 
growing pension gap (defined as the difference between today’s and forecasted future gross 
pension levels) and the level of additional benefits provided by the Riester pension based on 
different assumptions regarding rates of return. 
Figure 7: Filling the pension gap 
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Source: MEA calculations based on the Rürup commission’s demography and labor market projections. 
 
While the Riester pensions can fill the pension gap in the long run, they are however, not 
sufficient for the older cohorts. Younger cohorts born after 1970 will be in a position to build 
up even higher pension entitlements than was previously the case, thanks to their 
supplementary pension savings. Older cohorts, however, will need to save more than the 
envisaged maximum saving rates in Table 4 in order to close this gap entirely during the time 
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still available to them. Obviously, rather than a slow increase to a fixed 4 percent of gross 
income, initial saving rates have to be high and be tailored to each cohort.35 
Given successful take-up, the future composition of retirement income will be quite different 
from the current monolithic one. Figure 8 outlines this development by birth cohort in the year 
of their retirement under the assumption that the insured cohorts have adhered to the 
recommended Riester savings rates of Table 4. 
Figure 8: Composition of retirement income by birth cohort 
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Figure 8 shows that even at full uptake, the German PAYG system will remain the dominant 
pillar for old age provision. Riester pensions will make up about 35 percent of state organized 
retirement income. Should other income sources (currently about 15 percent of total retirement 
income) stay as they are, this would yield a share of PAYG pensions in total retirement income 
at about 55 to 60 percent. Some crowding out of existing occupational pensions and other 
private pensions by the new Riester pensions is likely, however, as mentioned earlier. 
                                                 
35 See the proposals by Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) and Börsch-Supan (2002). 
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5.3 Will the “Riester” reform stabilize the German pension system? 
Of course, the main litmus test of the Riester reform is whether the shift from PAYG to a 
partially funded pension system will stabilize the contribution rates for the younger generation 
with acceptable replacement rates for the older generation. The Riester reform actually was 
quite courageous in writing into the law that the standard pension replacement level must not 
fall below 67 percent and at the same time that the contribution rate must not exceed 20 percent 
until 2020 and 22 percent until 2030. Can these promises be kept? 
The answer is – quite unambiguously – no. Our answer is based on the “official” demography 
and economic projections adopted by the “Rürup commission” and the Ministry for Health & 
Social Security.36  We look first at standard replacement rates.37  Model calculations of the 
long-term impact of pension adjustments demonstrate that, as a result of the new Riester 
adjustment formula, future pension levels will fall more than first predicted by the government, 
see Figure 9.38  They will fall below 67 percent very quickly, and eventually reach 62 percent. 
Figure 9: Development of pension levels prior to and after the 2001 reform 
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Source: MEA calculations based on the Rürup commission’s demography and labor market projections. 
                                                 
36 The demographic projections (fertility, mortality, migration) are considered realistic by academic demographers 
while the economic assumptions (growth, employment) are slightly optimistic. 
37 The reader is reminded that the standard replacement rate does NOT relate to the LAST earnings before 
retirement. Rather, the “standard replacement rate” refers to the pension of a worker, who had 45 earnings points, 
divided by the average net earnings off all current workers. 
38 See also Bonin (2001) and Prognos (2001). 
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 The scale of this reduction also clearly demonstrates that the pension benefits provided by the 
PAYG public retirement insurance scheme will not be sufficient in themselves – that is without 
supplementary pension provision - to safeguard pensioners’ standards of living in old age. 
Although the new adjustment formula will in effect bring about a larger reduction in pension 
levels than was perceived by public opinion, the most dramatic difference between promise and 
current projection relates to the objective of stabilizing contribution rates. Figure 10 depicts our 
projection for the long-term development of contribution rates prior to and after the reform. 
Figure 10: Contribution rates prior to and after the 2001 Reform 
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Source: MEA calculations based on the Rürup commission’s demography and labor market projections. 
 
While the Riester reform substantively reduces the contribution rate to the PAYG pillar, Figure 
10 shows that the 20 percent line will be exceeded by 2014, and 22 percent by 2022. 
The apparent failure of the Riester reform to reach its main objectives – stabilization of the 
contribution rate at acceptable pension benefit levels – was not accidental. As a matter of fact, 
the overoptimistic demographic and economic assumptions were chosen in a fragile political 
compromise between reformists and unions that enabled the Riester reform package to pass the 
parliamentary hurdles. 
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6 New Reform Efforts: the Rürup Commission 
When it became obvious that the Riester reform measures would not suffice to meet the 
contribution rate and pension level targets, a new reform commission, the “Commission for 
Sustainability in Financing the German Social Insurance Systems”, popularly referred to as the 
Rürup commission after its chairman Bert Rürup, was established in November 2002.39 Its twin 
objectives are those of the Riester reform: to stabilize contribution rates while at the same time 
ensuring appropriate future pension levels. 
The Rürup commission met in 2003 a different situation than Riester in 2001. Unexpectedly 
high unemployment and the poor performance of the German economy with extremely low 
growth rates precipitated a short-run financial crisis of the pension system and created a sense 
of urgency for reform. Moreover, the awareness increased that stabilizing social security 
contributions in total labor compensation is essential to enhance future growth. This paradigm 
shift away from thinking in claims towards thinking in financing possibilities had a noticeable 
impact on the commission’s reform proposals. 
In addition, the commission profited from the fact that the Riester reform had already paved the 
way for a more forceful shift from pay-as-you-go financed first-pillar pensions to funded 
second and third-pillar pensions. 
6.1 Reform proposals 
The reform proposal, published end of August 2003, comprises two major components: a 
gradual increase of the normal retirement age from 65 to 67 years and a modification of the 
pension benefit indexation formula linking benefits to the system dependency ratio. The first 
component is accompanied by adjustments to the various early retirement ages, and the second 
component is accompanied by a revision of the Riester pension regulations. While the main 
two components directly serve to achieve the desired stabilization of contribution rates, the 
accompanying measures keep the system of pathways to retirement balanced and address some 
of the widely criticized aspects of the newly introduced second and third-pillar pensions. 
                                                 
39 The commission was in charge of making reform proposals for the pension system, the health care and the long-
term care insurance. We only refer to the pension proposals. 
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Increase of the normal retirement age. The commission proposes to increase the normal 
retirement age from 65 to 67 years. The increase is slow and gradual, starting in 2011 with 
monthly steps such that age 67 will be reached in 2035. This increase corresponds to two-thirds 
of the projected change in life expectancy at age 65. It will therefore simply offset future 
increases in the total value of accumulated benefits generated by a longer pension recipiency 
duration. The reasoning behind this increase in retirement age is that the prolonged life span 
necessitates a commensurable increase in the active part of it, unless the pension system is 
continuously being expanded. 
In order to prevent substitution into early retirement and disability pensions as a result of the 
increase in the retirement age, the commission also proposed to increase the early retirement 
ages (at the same extent and schedule as the normal retirement age) and to increase the 
actuarial adjustments for disabled and long-term insured workers. Since there were additional 
worries about the coverage for workers subject to extreme physical wear and tear due to long 
years of hard work, a new pension type was introduced which makes it possible for workers 
with a service life of at least 45 years to retire two years earlier, however, with additional 
actuarial adjustments. 
Change of the benefit indexation formula: the “sustainability factor”.  The commission 
proposes to extend the Riester benefit indexation formula by a new factor, the so-called 
“sustainability factor”. This factor reflects the development of the relative number of 
contributors to pensioners, the system dependency ratio, which is the most important long-term 
determinant of pension financing.40 The new pension formula looks as follows: 
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                          Note: The lags are due to data availability. 
                                                 
40 Strictly speaking, the sustainability factor will link benefits to the “equivalized system dependency ratio” in 
order to avoid distortions created by extremely low contributions and/or pension benefits. This ratio standardizes 
the number of pensioners by converting standard pensions into the number of “equivalence pensioners”. The 
number of “equivalence contributors” is likewise calculated by standardizing the average earner. 
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It includes the sustainability factor in squared brackets, weighted by α, and replaces the one-
time shift in the somewhat awkward “sensitivity parameter” dt, see section 4.4. If α equals 
zero, the current Riester pension adjustment formula would remain unchanged. If α equals one, 
the new indexation formula would imply a purely income-oriented pension benefit adjustment 
policy. The commission set the value of α at 1/4, thereby fulfilling the Riester objectives to 
keep the contribution rate under 20 percent until 2020 and under 22 percent until 2030. 
The new pension formula will lead to further decreases in pension benefit levels vis-à-vis the 
path planned by the Riester reform, see section 6.2. In contrast to the proposed “demography 
factor” in the failed 1999 reform attempt, the sustainability factor considers not only the 
development of life expectancy but the entire demographic development (including changes in 
migration and notably in birth rates), as well as the development on the labor market. This is 
important as the inevitably reduction of the working-age population can be compensated by a 
higher labor force participation of women and elderly workers. The introduction of the 
sustainability factor thus allows to directly link pension adjustments to the crucial factors 
determining pension financing, namely the number of contributors and benefit recipients. This 
gives the new pension benefit indexation formula a self-stabilizing effect. 
In order to compensate for this decrease, a further strengthening of second and third-pillar 
pensions will be necessary. Since the uptake of the funded supplementary Riester pension has 
been modest so far (as was mentioned in section 5.1), the commission proposed a host of 
administrative changes to occupational and private pensions in order to make the system easier 
to handle and thus more popular. Among these are the expansion of the group of entitled 
persons to all tax payers, dynamic pension benefits, increased transparency in the private 
pension provision. These administrative changes accompany the proposed introduction of an 
EET-type ex post taxation of pensions.41 
                                                 
41  A parallel commission, also headed by Bert Rürup, proposed to keep pension contributions and capital gains 
tax exempt (EE), and to tax benefits (T). See Börsch-Supan and Lührmann (2000). 
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6.2 Projected long-term effects of the reform proposals 
Are the reform proposals by the Rürup commission sufficient to counteract the foreseen 
consequences of demographic change and stabilize the system? Will it keep the contribution 
rate below the targets set by Riester, and at the same time generate a level of pension income 
that, taking all pillars into account, corresponds to today’s level? In this section, we focus on 
the main components of the reform proposals and take a look at their long-term effects.42  
Figure 11 and Figure 12 illustrate how the introduction of the sustainability factor and the 
increase of the retirement age affect contribution rates and pension levels for varying values of 
α. 
Figure 11: The effects of the sustainability factor on the development of contribution 
rates 
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Source: MEA calculations based on the Rürup commission’s demographic and labor market projections. 
                                                 
42 Cf. the projections of the Commission (2003c). 
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Figure 12: The effects of the sustainability factor on pension levels 
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Source: MEA calculations based on the Rürup commission’s demographic and labor market projections. 
 
If α equals one, the sustainability factor generates a purely income-oriented pension benefit 
policy. The contribution rate will remain stable, while benefits will decline to around 30 
percent of gross earnings. 
A weighting factor α of 0.5 would spread the additional financial burden created by the 
increasing dependency burden more equally between contributors and beneficiaries. It results 
in a contribution rate of 20.1 percent in 2020, 21.4 percent in 2030, and a benefit level in 2030 
of around 37 percent of gross earnings. 
The commission’s reform targets are just met when α is set equal to 0.25. It results in a 
contribution rate a little lower than 23 percent in 2030, while the level of pensions is just over 
40 percent of gross earnings. 
Taking account of the increase in the normal retirement age to 67, which increases pension 
benefits according to the German benefit formula, and adding second and/or third pillar 
pensions, the Rürup proposal manages to deliver an income level for retirees that is comparable 
to today’s income level – however, only after about 2030, see Figure 13. This projection 
assumes a saving rate of 4% into second and third-pillar pensions from 2009 on, starting in a 
stepwise fashion according to Table 4. 
Figure 13: Total pension level including private Riester pensions 
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Figure 13 quite clearly shows the crux of all transition models: the transition generation will 
have to pay extra in order to maintain their total retirement income when the income from pay-
as-you-go pensions is reduced. More refined transition models show that a saving rate of 8% is 
sufficient for the cohort with the highest transition burden (Birg and Börsch-Supan, 1999). 
6.3 Will the Rürup-proposals become law? 
At the time of this writing (August 2003), the process of converting the Rürup proposals into 
law has just begun. Will the proposal survive the parliamentary process without being altered 
to non-recognition? 
The politics of shifting the retirement age are clearly not favorable. According to survey results 
by Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001, 2002a and b), raising the retirement age is one of 
the most unpopular pension reform options in Germany, see Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Popularity of pension reform options 
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An interesting result of this survey is that this option is particularly unpopular among those 
who are least informed about the costs of the current pension system. Hence, while early 
retirement is a well appreciated social achievement among Germans, awareness of the costs of 
early retirement may moderate the opposition to increasing the retirement age. 
Another lesson from this survey is that any new reform should introduce flexibility in the hard 
choice between a later retirement age and a lower pay-as-you-go pension level, supplemented 
by private pensions which cut into consumption. As long as pensions are calculated in an 
actuarially fair fashion, taking all side effects to the economy into account, there is no need for 
a “normal retirement age”, and workers can decide themselves between working longer and 
saving more. The recent experience in the US in the aftermath of the bubble burst appears to 
indicate that workers are quite aware of this substitution. Flexibility minimizes the opposition 
to reform proposals relative to proposals which make cuts in only one direction, say, increasing 
the normal retirement age. However, the Rürup commission did not manage to introduce 
actuarially correct adjustments of pension benefits to retirement age. 
It seems that the pressures from the current underperformance of the German economy have 
helped to overcome these problems to a large extent. It is too early to tell. However, while the 
proposal has met fierce opposition from unions and pensioner advocacy groups, the core 
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elements of the proposal – shifting the retirement age and linking pension benefits to system 
dependency – have been broadly accepted by the government. 
7 Conclusions 
The first part of this paper described the generous German pension system, as it was in place 
between 1972 and the end of the nineties. It generated early retirement ages and high 
replacement rates, but at high costs to society in form of a large cost percentage of GDP (about 
12 percent) and high contribution rates (about 28 percent of gross income, of which 19,5 
percent are direct contributions and 8,5 percent indirect contributions for state subsidies 
financed by general taxes). 
The Riester reform in 2001, described in Part B, attempts to reduce the tax and contribution 
burden by transforming the monolithic PAYG system to a multipillar system with subsidized 
or tax-privileged private pensions in individual accounts or as occupational pensions. The 
reform is an important first step towards solving the demographic problems confronting the 
pension system. It does not, however, stabilize the public PAYG pillar in the coming decades. 
While the uptake of the new Riester pensions is rather sluggish, it is not possible at this early 
point to reach a final conclusion on the success or failure of the Riester incentives. 
Further reform is certainly necessary. This is why the Rürup commission was established in 
November 2002. In contrast to the Riester reform it did take the political risk of proposing a 
rise in normal retirement ages and a further reduction in long-term benefits. As a major 
innovation, it linked benefits to the system dependency ratio and therefore provides an 
automatic stabilisator. Whether the Rürup proposals become law has to be seen – quite clearly, 
the slow but steady reform process of the German pension system needs to continue as the 
German population ages. 
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